In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games. Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs.
Introduction
Several recent papers have modelled the distribution of payoffs in a cooperative game as a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, players decide on the extent and nature of cooperation with other players. During this period, players cannot enter into binding agreements of any kind, either on the nature of cooperation or on the subsequent division of payoffs. In the second period, the payoffs are given by an exogenously given allocation rule.
Perhaps, the first paper in this area was Hart and Kurz (1983) . They analyze a situation where the first stage consists of a game where strategies of the players are announcements of players with whom a particular player wants to form a coalition. Dutta, Nouweland and Tijs (1996) and Qin (1996) focus attention on Myerson's (1977) cooperation structures rather than coalition structures. A cooperation structure is a graph whose vertices are identified with the players. A link between two players means that the players can carry on meaningful and direct negotiations with each other. These authors use a strategic game suggested by Myerson (1991) , where each player announces the set of players with whom he or she wants to form a link. Then a link is formed between players i and j if and only if both i and j want to form a link with each other. Dutta et al. (1996) show that for a large class of allocation rules, the complete graph is the unique (up to payoff equivalence) undominated Nash equilibrium or coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
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In this paper, we consider the related problem of formation of hypergraphs. In a hypergraph the vertices are identified with the players and each edge represents a conference, that is a subset of players. Direct negotiations between players can only take place within conferences.
2 Note that since a graph can be viewed as a special hypergraph in which each conference is a pair of players, the model in the present paper is a generalization of the model of Myerson (1991) . Our primary focus of interest is to see which hypergraphs
1 Aumann and Myerson (1988) consider an alternative formulation where in the first stage, cooperation structures form through a sequential process.
2 See Myerson (1980) who proposed the use of hypergraphs to model cooperation possibilities between players.
turn out to result from potential maximizing strategies.
3 We show that the complete hypergraph results from a potential maximizing strategy. Conversely, every potential maximizing strategy results in a cooperation structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete hypergraph.
In the process of proving the main result, we also show that under an efficiency requirement, the only allocation rule which results in a conference formation game being a weighted potential game is the weighted (extended) Myerson value. We also find a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the class of weighted (extended) Myerson values.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we will show that a non-cooperative game is a weighted potential game if and only if its payoff function coincides with weight- shown that the only solution concepts resulting in a weighted potential game are the weighted (extended) Myerson values. In section 5 we show that the argmax set of the weighted potential corresponds to the full cooperation structure and payoff-equivalent structures. We conclude in section 6.
Potential games
In Ui (1996) a representation theorem for potential games is given in terms of the Shapley value. In this section we will extend the result of Ui (1996) and provide a representation theorem for weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values. We will first give some definitions.
A game in strategic form will be denoted by Γ = (N; (S i ) i∈N ; (π i ) i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the player set, S i the strategy space of player i ∈ N, and π = (π i ) i∈N the payoff function which assigns to every strategy-tuple s = (s i ) i∈N ∈ i∈N S i = S a vector in IR N . For notational convenience we write s −i = (s j ) j∈N\{i} and s R = (s i ) i∈R . and Shapley (1996) formally defined the class of weighted potential games.
Monderer
++ be a vector of positive weights. A function Q w : i∈N S i → IR is called a w-potential for Γ if for every i ∈ N, every s ∈ S, and every t i ∈ S i it holds that
The game Γ is called a w-potential game if it admits a w-potential. Γ is called a weighted potential game if Γ is a w-potential game for some weights w ∈ IR N ++ . Monderer and Shapley (1996) point out that the argmax set of a weighted potential game does not depend on a particular choice of a weighted potential, and hence can be used as an equilibrium refinement. They also remark that this refinement is supported by some experimental results. Weighted Shapley values can easily be defined using unanimity games. For every R ⊆ N the unanimity game (N, u R ) is defined by
Unanimity games were introduced by Shapley (1953) . He showed that every cooperative game can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way, v = R⊆N α R u R , where (α R ) R⊆N are called the unanimity coordinates of (N, v).
++ be a vector of positive weights. For all R ⊆ N define w R := i∈R w i . The weighted Shapley value Φ w of a cooperative game (N, v) ∈ T U N with unanimity coordinates (α R ) R⊆N is then defined by
4 Monderer and Shapley (1996) point out that this may be a mere coincidence. See also Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Crawford (1991) .
5 R ⊆ T denotes that R is a subset of T , R ⊂ T denotes that R is a strict subset of T .
To represent weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values we need the following interaction between cooperative and non-cooperative games.
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Consider a player set N = {1, . . . , n} and strategy space S = i∈N S i . Assume that once the players have chosen a strategy profile s ∈ S they face the cooperative game (N, v s ). Furthermore, assume that the players have made a pre-play agreement on the allocation rule that determines their payoffs for any chosen cooperative game. If the players have agreed on allocation rule γ this implies that player i obtains γ i (N, v s ) if strategy profile s ∈ S is played.
We will restrict ourselves to collections of cooperative games where the value of a coalition does not depend on the strategies of the players outside this coalition, v s (R) only depends on s R . This means that we restrict ourselves to the following set of collections of cooperative games:
Denote the unanimity coordinates of the game v s by (α s R ) R⊆N . It can be shown that the condition in definition (4) can be rewritten in terms of these unanimity coordinates,
We can now state the main result of this section, which states that the class of weighted potential games can be represented in terms of weighted Shapley values.
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Theorem 2.1 Let Γ = (N; (S i ) i∈N ; (π i ) i∈N ) be a game in strategic form and w ∈ IR N ++ . Γ is a w-potential game if and only if there exists {(N, v s )} s∈S ∈ G N,S such that
Proof: First we will prove the if-part of the theorem. Assume there exists
6 Note that we consider weighted potentials for non-cooperative games, as opposed to Hart and MasColell (1989) who characterize weighted Shapley values using weighted potentials for cooperative games.
7 If there is no ambiguity about the underlying player set we will simply write Φ
We will show that Q w is a w-potential of Γ. Let i ∈ N, s ∈ S, and t i ∈ S i , then
where the third equality follows from (5).
To prove the only-if-part assume Γ is a w-potential game, with potential Q w . Define
Finally, we will show that for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S it holds that Φ
This completes the proof.
Networks
In this section we will first introduce hypergraphs. After that we will discuss hypergraph communication situations and characterize a class of allocation rules for these situations.
A hypergraph is a pair (N, H) with N the player set and H a family of subsets of 1. every {i} ⊆ S is an interaction set.
every H ∈ H(S)
is an interaction set.
3. if T 1 and T 2 are interaction sets with T 1 ∩ T 2 = ∅, then T 1 ∪ T 2 is an interaction set.
8 It holds that Q w (s) = P w (N, v s ), where P w denotes the weighted potential for cooperative games as used in the characterization of the weighted Shapley values by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) .
We call a set T ⊆ S an interaction component of S if T is an interaction set of (S, H(S)) and there exists no interaction set T of (S, H(S)) with T ⊂ T . We will denote the resulting partition of S in interaction components by S/H. 
Conform this partition we define the value of coalition
We will characterize the w-weighted (extended) Myerson value by two properties, component efficiency and w-fairness. Consider for an allocation rule γ these two properties:
Component efficiency: For all hypergraph communication situations (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N it holds for all C ∈ N/H:
Component efficiency states that the players in an interaction component divide the value v(C) amongst themselves. The property w-fairness is an extension of the fairness property of Myerson (1980) , who characterized the (extended) Myerson value by the properties component efficiency and fairness.
The following lemma shows that the w-weighted (extended) Myerson value satisfies the two properties component efficiency and w-fairness. In the proof we use some results of Kalai and Samet (1988) . They showed that the w-weighted Shapley value satisfies the dummy property, additivity, and partnership consistency. The dummy property states 
Since C is an interaction component of (N, H) it holds that v 
where the fourth equality follows from the efficiency of the w-weighted Shapley value.
Secondly, we will show that the w-weighted (extended) Myerson value satisfies wfairness. Let (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N and H ∈ H. Define H := H\{H} and v :
For all T ⊆ N with H ⊆ T we then have
since T/H = T/H . This means that H is a partnership in v . From partnership consistency of Φ w , it follows for all i ∈ H that
From this we find
where the first and third equalities follow from the definition of the game (N, v ) and the additivity of the w-weighted Shapley values. Hence, µ w satisfies w-fairness.
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The following theorem shows that the w-weighted (extended) Myerson value is the unique rule that is component efficient and w-fair. Proof: From lemma 3.1 we know that µ w satisfies component efficiency and w-fairness.
We only need to show here that µ w is the unique solution concept which satisfies these properties.
Suppose there are two rules γ 1 and γ 2 which satisfy component efficiency and wfairness. Let (N, v, H) be a communication situation with a minimum number of conferences such that γ 1 (H) = γ 2 (H). By component efficiency it follows that H = ∅. Let H ∈ H and {i, j} ⊆ H. From w-fairness of γ 1 we then find
This expression is valid for all pairs {i, j} for which there exists an H ∈ H with {i, j} ⊆ H. Hence, it is also valid for all pairs {s, t} that are in the same interaction component.
Let C ∈ N/H and i ∈ C. For all j ∈ C we now have
Since w ∈ IR N ++ it follows that d = 0. Since C was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that γ 1 (H) = γ 2 (H).
4 Network formation
In this section we will model the process that leads to the formation of a conference structure as a game in strategic form. The game is a generalization of the linking game as formulated by Myerson (1991) and discussed by Dutta, Nouweland and Tijs (1996) .
Furthermore, we will show that in this game, the only component efficient allocation rules that result in a weighted potential game are the weighted (extended) Myerson values.
Let γ be an allocation rule and (N, v) a cooperative game. Define the conference formation game Γ(N, v, γ) determined by the tuple (N; (S i ) i∈N ; (f
represents the strategy set of player i . A strategy of player i denotes the set of coalitions player i wants to join to form conferences. A strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ i∈N S i , induces a set of conferences H(s) given by
The interpretation is that a conference is formed if and only if all players in this conference are willing to form it. The payoff function f γ = (f γ i ) i∈N is then defined as the allocation rule applied to the conference structure formed,
In case there is no ambiguity about the underlying cooperative game we will simply write Γ(γ) instead of Γ (N, v, γ) . In the remainder we will consider an arbitrary game (N, v).
In order to prove that weighted (extended) Myerson values are the only allocation rules that are component efficient and that lead to conference formation games which are weighted potential games, we need two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 Let γ be an allocation rule and w ∈ IR N ++ . If the conference formation game Γ(γ) is a w-potential game, then for all hypergraphs (N, H), all H ⊆ N and all
Proof: Since Γ(γ) is a w-potential game, Γ(γ) has a w-potential P w . We will show that γ satisfies equation (9).
Let (N, H) be a hypergraph, so (N, v, H) ∈ HCS N . Define for all k ∈ N,
since the three strategy tuples all result in the formation of the same conferences, the conferences in H\{H}, and hence, they all result in the same payoffs.
Using this we find for all i, j ∈ H
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The following lemma shows that the conference formation game corresponding to an arbitrary cooperative game with a weighted (extended) Myerson value used as an allocation rule is a weighted potential game.
Lemma 4.2 The conference formation game Γ(µ w ) is a w-potential game.
Proof: Consider the following set of cooperative games, indexed by the set of strategy
) by definition, it follows by theorem 2.1 that Γ(µ w ) is a w-potential game. 2
If we combine the results of the lemmas above we can prove the next theorem. Proof: Suppose that the conference formation game Γ(γ) is a weighted potential game.
From lemma 4.1 it follows that there exist weights w for which γ satisfies equation (9). Since γ is component efficient, it then follows, by the proof of theorem 3.1, that γ coincides with µ w for all hypergraphs (N, H).
The reverse statement follows by lemma 4.2.
5 Potential maximizing strategies
In this section we will consider potential maximizing strategies in the conference formation game Γ(µ w ). Throughout this section we will assume that the underlying cooperative
We will show that the strategy resulting in the complete conference structure, the structure with all subsets of players in the set of conferences, is a potential maximizing strategy.
Furthermore, we will show that all potential maximizing strategies result in the same payoff as the strategy corresponding to the full cooperation structure.
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First we need some notation to denote the structures that will result according to the conference formation game with a weighted (extended) Myerson value used as allocation rule. Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) be the strategy tuple with s i = 2 N\{i} for all i ∈ N. This strategy implies that player i is willing to cooperate with all subsets of the other players.
The corresponding set of conferences will be denoted by H := H(s) = {T ∈ 2 N | |T | ≥ 2}. A set of conferences H is called essentially complete with regard to solution concept γ iff H and H are payoff-equivalent, i.e. γ(H) = γ(H). To facilitate the proof of the main theorem in this section we will first prove two lemmas. The first lemma states that a player is never worse off forming an additional conference, extending a result of Myerson (1977) . 
From Weber (1988) it follows that there exists a probability distribution p 
Combining equations (10) and (11) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} that µ w i+1 (H(s i+1 )) ≥ µ w i+1 (H(s i )), so P w (s i+1 ) ≥ P w (s i ). Thus P w (s) = P w (s n ) ≥ P w (s n−1 ) ≥ . . . ≥ P w (s 1 ) ≥ P w (s 0 ) = P w (t). (18) conferences. This is shown in a much more technical way, not using the representation theorem of section 2, in Dutta, Nouweland and Tijs (1995), a preliminary version of Dutta et al. (1996) .
Our results point in the direction of the formation of a full cooperation structure.
However, if we drop the superadditivity assumption or consider another solution concept, this need not be the case. Aumann and Myerson (1988) derive different results for a game where the cooperation structure is formed sequentially rather than simultaneously.
